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It’s  a  pleasure  to  be  with  you  this  afternoon  to 
discuss  some  of  the  longer-run  issues  the  Fed  is 
confronting  in  conducting  monetary  policy.  I  am 
particularly  happy  to  have  the  opportunity  to appear 
before  a group  of  economists  who  are  actively  en- 
gaged  in  business  and  commerce.  The  monetary 
policy  decisions  we make  at the  Fed  have  important 
effects  on all business  firms-industrial  and other  non- 
financial  companies  as well  as financial  institutions. 
Consequently,  it  is  important  that  executives  and 
managers  in  all sectors  of  the  economy  be  at  least 
generally  familiar with  the  principal  continuing  issues 
and  problems  with  which  the  Fed  is grappling. 
This  is, of course,  a particularly  interesting  period 
in our  nation’s  recent  economic  history.  On  the  one 
side,  we  continue  to  face  a  number  of  serious 
economic  difficulties.  The  federal  budget  deficit,  the 
trade  deficit,  and  the  international  debt  problem  are 
perhaps  the  most  obvious  of  these,  but  there  are 
several  others  as we are all aware.  At the  same  time, 
I think  most  people  would  agree  that  we’ve  made 
considerable  progress  on a number  of economic  fronts 
since  the  tumultuous  early  years  of this  decade.  We 
are  now  midway  through  the  fifth  year  of  the  cur- 
rent  business  upswing,  which  is  well  beyond  the 
average  length  of postwar  expansions.  Approximately 
14 million  new jobs  have  been  added  to the  employ- 
ment  rolls during  this period,  and the  unemployment 
rate  has  declined  4.8  percentage  points  from  its 
recession  high  of  10.8  percent  to  its  present  level 
of 6.0  percent.  Further,  after  peaking  somewhere  in 
the  neighborhood  of  10 percent  in  1980  and  198 1, 
the  underlying  trend  rate  of inflation  has declined  to 
about  4  percent. 
Inflation as a Problem 
I would  like  to  focus  particularly  on  inflation  to- 
day,  because  I believe  that  the  System  has  a special 
responsibility  regarding  the  national  goal  of extend- 
ing and then  maintaining  the  recent  progress  against 
inflation.  It is now  almost  universally  agreed  among 
economists  that  monetary  policy  has  a  substantial 
effect  on  the  inflation  rate  over  time,  although  there 
is  still  some  disagreement  over  the  significance  of 
other  factors.  Moreover,  many  economists,  including 
this  one,  believe  that  the  inflation  rate  is the  only 
economic  variable  the  Fed  or any  other  central  bank 
can  influence  systematically  over  the  long  run  and 
would  therefore  argue  that  price  stability  should  be 
the  preeminent  goal  of  monetary  policy. 
Before  we  congratulate  ourselves  too  vigorously 
about  our  success  on the  inflation  front,  let me  make 
two  points  to  help  put  this  progress  in perspective. 
First,  even  though  the  current  underlying  inflation 
of about  4 percent  is certainly  an improvement  over 
the  much  higher  rates  of  a few  years  ago,  it  is not 
a particularly  admirable  performance  when  judged 
against  longer-run  standards.  Most  of you  probably 
recall  that  the  Nixon  Administration  imposed  a com- 
prehensive  wage and price  freeze  on the  country  back 
in  1971  when  the  inflation  rate  was  actually  a little 
less  than  4  percent. 
Second,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  there  is 
no  particular  reason  to  expect  this  progress  to 
continue  automatically.  Not  too  many  months  ago, 
it  was  not  uncommon  to  hear  some  of  the  more 
optimistic  in  our  midst  proclaim  that  inflation  had 
been  conquered  and was dead.  It was as though  the 
high  inflation  of the  late  seventies  and  early  eighties 
had  been  some  sort  of exotic  disease  that  had  been 
eradicated  by  a new  wonder  drug.  But  clearly  there 
is no  good  reason  to  believe  that  anything  like  this 
has happened.  It doesn’t  matter  whether  one  believes 
that  inflation  is caused  by  excessive  growth  in  the 
money  supply,  or  rising  oil  prices,  or  high  labor 
costs,  or  whatever:  there  has  been  no  fundamental 
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guarantee  that  inflation  won’t  accelerate  again.  For 
example,  if one  believes  that  rapid  money  growth 
causes  inflation,  there  has  been  no  really  basic  in- 
stitutional  change  in  the  monetary  regime,  such  as 
a return  to the  gold  standard  or the  adoption  of some 
kind  of Constitutional  amendment,  that  might  reduce 
the  probability  of  sustained  excessive  monetary 
growth  in  some  definitive  way. 
Some  of the  earlier  apparent  lack  of concern  about 
inflation  has  been  replaced  more  recently  with  a 
rather  sharp  revival  of  concern,  as  evidenced  by 
rising  inflationary  expectations  in financial  markets 
“ 
.  * .  this question of whether the Zonger-mn 
strategy of monetary poZicy  shodd  be 
discretionary .  .  .  or based on a  de  of 
sonze  kind is without any doubt the  most 
important standing issue in the #et2  of 
monetary  poZicy t0d&  ” 
and  corresponding  increases  in  long-term  interest 
rates.  Some  observers  think  these  worries  do  not 
reflect  a  true  increase  in  the  underlying  rate  of 
inflation  and  are instead  a premature  reaction  to the 
recent  upswing  in oil prices  and  the  short-run  effects 
of the  depreciation  of the  dollar.  This  may  be  right, 
but,  quite  frankly,  I was  happy  to  see  this  evidence 
that  the  earlier  “inflation  is dead”  mentality  is on the 
wane. 
If I am right  in my  assessment  that  inflation  is still 
a problem,  what  does  this  continuing  risk  of  infla- 
tion  imply?  Well,  obviously  it  means  that  we  need 
to  take  whatever  preventive  steps  are  necessary  to 
keep  inflation  under  control.  The  correct  steps  to 
take,  in  turn,  depend  on  what  factors  are  most 
likely  to  cause  another  round  of  high  inflation.  Let 
me  confess  right  up  front  that  I’m  one  of  those 
people  who  believes  that  the  evidence  supports 
Milton  Friedman’s  famous  dictum  that  inflation  is 
always  and  everywhere  a  monetary  phenomenon. 
Consequently,  I think  the  most  effective  thing  we 
can  do to reduce  the  risk of inflation  is to take  a hard 
look  at the  present  strategy  of Fed  monetary  policy 
and  determine  what  we  can  do  to  improve  it  and, 
if necessary,  repair  it.  Against  this  background,  I’11 
focus  the  remainder  of my  comments  on our strategy 
at  the  Fed.  I’ll begin  with  a brief  description  of  the 
strategy.  Then  I’ll make  a few comments  about  things 
I personally  believe  might  be  done  to  make  it more 
effective.  I  should  emphasize  that  the  views  I’ll 
express  are  my  own  and  don’t  necessarily  reflect  the 
views  of  anyone  else  in  the  Fed. 
Federal Reserve Operating Strategy 
Let  me  begin  with  just  a  quick  overview  of  the 
current  strategy,  which  has been  in place  in one  form 
or another  since  the  mid-1970s.  The  essence  of the 
strategy  is  that  we  try  to  control  the  growth  of 
certain  monetary  aggregates  over  time  in  order  to 
hold  inflation  in check  and  create  the  kind  of stable 
monetary  and financial  environment  that  is conducive 
to  high  employment  and  steady  growth  in  real 
economic  production.  As  you  know,  the  Federal 
Open  Market  Committee  sets  annual  target  ranges 
for  the  growth  of several  monetary  aggregates-the 
familiar  “M’s” that  get  widespread  attention  in  the 
financial  media.  The  Committee  establishes  these 
ranges  each  year  at  its  meeting  in February  for  the 
year  ahead.  It  then  reevaluates  the  ranges  at  its 
meeting  in  July  and  makes  any  adjustments  that 
appear  appropriate  in the  light  of events  during  the 
first  half  of the  year.  During  the  course  of the  year, 
the  Committee  seeks  generally  to  hold  the  growth 
of  the  aggregates  within  their  respective  ranges, 
although  the  firmness  of the  Committee’s  efforts  to 
achieve  this  objective  may  be  affected  by  emerging 
developments  in other  areas of the  economy.  Because 
the  Committee  has  no  means  of  controlling  the 
aggregates  directly,  it  does  so  indirectly  using 
certain  short-run  operating  “instruments.”  These 
instruments  change  from  time  to  time,  but  they  are 
all indicators  of the  relative  ease  or  stringency  with 
which  the  Fed  is supplying  reserves  to  depository 
institutions.  Under  the  present  procedure,  which  has 
been  in place  since  the  fall  of  1982,  the  operating 
instrument  has  been  the  aggregate  level  of seasonal 
and  adjustment  borrowing  at the  discount  window. 
The  Committee  sets  a  short-run  objective  for  this 
instrument  at each  of its regular  meetings,  which  are 
held  at  five-  to  six-week  intervals. 
That’s  a quick  overview  of the  strategy.  Now  let 
me  make  three  important  points  about  the  strategy, 
and then  I’ll go into  a little  more  detail  on each  point 
in turn.  The  first point  is that  this procedure  belongs 
to  a  particular  class  of  strategies  referred  to  as 
“intermediate  target”  strategies.  In  these  strategies, 
as the  name  implies,  the  Fed  does  not  set  specific 
quantitative  objectives  for  the  final  goal variables  of 
economic  policy,  such  as the  rate  of growth  of  real 
GNP,  the  price  level,  and  the  unemployment  rate. 
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intermediate  position  between  these  goal  variables 
and those  we can control  directly,  such  as the  Federal 
funds  rate  or  the  rate  of  growth  of  reserves  of 
depository  institutions.  The  monetary  aggregates  the 
Fed  currently  targets  are  intermediate  variables  in 
this  sense.  We  can’t  control  them  directly  and  pre- 
cisely,  nor  are  they  final  goal  variables  of monetary 
policy.  I consider  the  use  of monetary  aggregates  as 
intermediate  targets  especially  appropriate  because 
it  is well  established  that  there  is  a  close  relation- 
ship  between  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money 
supply  and the  rate  of inflation  over  the  longer  haul. 
Rapid  money  growth,  in  particular,  leads  to  high 
inflation,  while  moderate  growth  is  generally 
associated  with  low  inflation. 
The  second  point  about  the  strategy  is that  we’ve 
been  having  some  technical  problems  with  it  in 
recent  years.  The  predictability  of the  statistical  rela- 
tionship  between  the  key  monetary  aggregate  known 
as Ml,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  growth  of  current 
dollar  (or “nominal”)  GNP  and  the  rate  of inflation, 
on  the  other,  has  diminished  significantly.’  In  any 
case,  very  rapid  growth  in M 1 in both  the  1982-83 
period  and more  recently  in  198.5 and  1986  has  not 
been  followed-at  least  not  yet-by  the  usual lagged 
rise in the  rate of inflation.  The  reduced  predictability 
of  this  relationship  prompted  the  Fed  to  drop  the 
Ml  target  in  1987,  but  I believe  that  this  decision, 
even  though  it  may  be  justified  as  a  technical 
matter,  has  weakened  the  strategy  because  the  Ml 
target  has  traditionally  been  one  of the  most  impor- 
tant  elements  of  the  strategy. 
The  final point  about  the  strategy  is that  it is and 
for  many  years  has  been  a discretionary  strategy  as 
opposed  to  a strategy  based  on  a rule,  even  though 
at a superficial  level  it has  some  of the  appearances 
of a rule.  It is discretionary  in two  senses.  First,  we 
do  not  use  any  predetermined  mechanical  formula 
in  determining  how  to  adjust  the  settings  of  our 
instrument  variables  to  deviations  of  the  monetary 
aggregates  from  their  target  ranges.  Second,  we  do 
not  give exclusive  weight  to such  deviations  in deter- 
mining  our  instrument  settings.  On  the  contrary,  we 
have  taken  into  account  the  behavior  of a number  of 
other  financial  and  economic  indicators,  including- 
at  one  time  or  another-long-term  interest  rates, 
foreign  exchange  rates,  conditions  in labor  markets, 
and general  business  confidence.  The  relative  weights 
we  give  the  monetary  aggregates  and  these  other 
* Ml  includes  the  public’s  holdings  of  currency  and  coin, 
demand  deposits,  and  interest-bearing  transactions  deposits  such 
as  NOW  accounts. 
indicators  in making  our  short-run  policy  decisions 
vary  over  time  in  an  ad  hoc,  discretionary  way. 
Indeed,  the  degree  of discretion  used  in conducting 
policy  is so great  at present  that  a case could  be made 
that  the  monetary  targeting  procedure  is now  more 
a broad  framework  than  a  true  strategy. 
Implementation of the Strategy 
Let  me  now  elaborate  a little  on  each  of the  three 
points  I’ve just  made. 
Intemediate Target Strategies  The  first  point  was 
that  targeting  monetary  aggregates  is one  of a class 
of  intermediate  target  strategies.  Some  economists 
have  argued  that  intermediate  target  strategies  are 
inferior  to  other  kinds  of  strategies  because  they 
insert  a redundant  intermediate  target  variable  be- 
tween  the  instrument  variables  that  the  Fed  controls 
directly  and  the  goal variables  of policy  in which  we 
are really  interested.  Why  not  simply  set  a target  for 
the  unemployment  rate,  say,  and  then  use  an 
econometric  model  to  determine  what  level  of 
borrowed  reserves  is most  likely  to  be  compatible 
with  that  objective? 
There  are  obviously  several  problems  with  such 
a strategy.  At  an operational  level,  the  linkages  be- 
tween  the  Fed’s  instruments  and  the  goal  variables 
of policy  are lengthy  and complex.  It is not  at all clear 
that  these  relationships  could  be  captured  by 
econometric  models  accurately  enough  to make  them 
operationally  useful.  The  relationships  between  the 
instruments  and the  monetary  aggregates,  in contrast, 
are  simpler  and  more  direct,  and  they  have  been 
analyzed  exhaustively  over  a  long  period  of  time. 
“ 
.  .  .  there is no compeZZing  reason to 
bedieve that the defeguZation  of interest 
rates and  the othr  &weZopments  of recent 
years hawe niwde it pemanentdy  and 
genmaZZy  inzpracticaZ  to target monetary 
aweiates.  ” 
More  fundamentally,  as  I  have  already  suggested, 
many  economists  believe  that  the  Fed  cannot 
systematically  influence  real  variables  like  the 
unemployment  rate  and  real  GNP  over  time.  Fol- 
lowing  this  line  of reasoning,  the  only  goal  variables 
the  Fed  can  influence  systematically  over  time  are 
the  price  level  and  inflation.  Building  a  strategy 
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variables  and  the  inflation  rate  is probably  possible 
in  principle,  and  it  may  well  be  the  best  strategy 
available  in  a  period  when  institutional  or  other 
changes  have  temporarily  reduced  the  effectiveness 
of  other  strategies.  But  such  a  strategy  might  be 
difficult  to implement  permanently  in practice,  since 
the  lag between  the  time  the  Fed  changes  one  of its 
instrument  settings  and  the  time  the  move  affects 
the  price  level  is long  and  variable.  Viewed  in  this 
light,  the  introduction  of intermediate  variables  such 
as the  monetary  aggregates  has  considerable  appeal, 
both  from  an  operational  standpoint  and  from  the 
standpoint  of explaining  the  strategy  to  the  public. 
My  personal  feeling  is that,  as a practical  matter,  our 
best  option  is to stick  with  some  form  of intermediate 
target  strategy. 
Recent Technical Pd&ms  in  Targeting Apgates 
This  brings  me  to  the  second  point  I  mentioned 
above:  the  technical  problems  we’ve  encountered 
recently  with  our  strategy  of  targeting  monetary 
aggregates.  As I’ve already  noted,  the  predictability 
of the  empirical  relationship  between  (1) the  growth 
of  Ml  and  (2)  the  growth  of  nominal  GNP  and 
inflation  has  diminished  significantly  in  the  1980s. 
Another  way  of  saying  this  is that  the  “velocity”  of 
“ .  .  .  important t/reoreetziZpapers  publ~s~~ 
by Robert Barn  and  David  Gordon in 
1983  .  .  .  concZuded  that discretionary 
strateghs are  inherentdy  inferior to those 
based on m?es since they inevitably 
pfi9h6-6 more infiation over time with no 
compensating fzdkzion  in 24nempZoyment.  ” 
Ml  has been  behaving  unpredictably.  The  velocities 
of the  broader  M2  and M3  aggregates  have  also been 
more  difficult  to  predict,  although  the  deterioration 
here  has  been  less  than  in  the  case  of  Ml.  Con- 
siderable  research  has  been  done  within  the  Fed  and 
elsewhere  to  determine  what  has  caused  this  prob- 
lem.  This  research  has  not  yet  yielded  definitive 
results,  but  it has  produced  several  plausible  partial 
answers.  First,  the  removal  of  restrictions  on  the 
interest  ceilings  on  most  classes  of  deposits  is 
believed  to  have  increased,  at least  temporarily,  the 
responsiveness  or “elasticity”  of the  public’s  demand 
for  money  balances  to  changes  in short-term  market 
interest  rates.  Thus,  movements  in interest  rates  now 
generate  a proportionately  greater  change  than  earlier 
in the  demand  for  money.  Such  changes  in money 
demand  affect  the  growth  rates  of  the  monetary 
aggregates  resulting  from  particular  settings  of  the 
Fed’s instrument  variables.  Further,  M 1 now includes 
a large  proportion  of  interest-bearing  accounts  that 
the  holders  probably  use  for  saving  and  investment 
as well  as transactions  purposes.  Consequently,  the 
demand  for  Ml  balances  probably  responds  differ- 
ently  to  changes  in household  wealth,  interest  rate 
spreads,  and  other  variables  now  than  it  did  a few 
years  ago when  Ml  consisted  primarily  of currency 
and  non-interest-bearing  demand  deposits  and  was 
therefore  a fairly  undiluted  measure  of transactions 
balances.  Finally,  the  sharp  and largely  unanticipated 
reduction  in inflation  in the  early  eighties  may  have 
increased  the  public’s  appetite  for  money  balances, 
in  relation  to  its  desire  to  hold  other  liquid  assets, 
since  lower  inflation  erodes  the  real  value  of money 
balances  more  slowly. 
Any  or  all of these  factors  may  explain  at least  in 
part  the  change  in  the  observed  relationships  be- 
tween  the  growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates  and 
other  economic  variables.  In  any  event,  these 
developments  raise  pressing  questions  regarding  the 
continued  viability  of  our  strategy  of  targeting  the 
aggregates,  at  least  in  its  present  form.  We  obvi- 
ously  need  to  know  whether  the  reduced  predicta- 
bility  of  the  relationships  between  the  aggregates 
we’ve been  targeting  and the  economy  is a temporary 
phenomenon  that  is part  of  the  transition  to  a less 
regulated,  less  inflationary  environment  or  a more 
permanent  development.  The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion  just  isn’t very  clear  yet.  My  personal  guess,  for 
whatever  it’s  worth,  is  that  the  relationships  will 
become  more  predictable  again  after  the  transition 
is  further  behind  us.  For  example,  the  practices 
banks  and  other  depository  institutions  follow  in 
setting  interest  rates  on interest-bearing  transactions 
deposits  are  likely  to  become  more  settled  and 
systematic  in relation  to movements  in market  rates 
than  they  are  at present,  which  would  increase  the 
predictability  of the  reaction  of the  monetary  aggre- 
gates  to  movements  in  market  rates.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances,  we  should  be able  to continue  focusing 
on the  traditional  monetary  aggregates,  including  Ml. 
If  I’m wrong,  however,  and  the  predictability  of 
some  or all of these  monetary  relationships  remains 
low,  we  may  have  to  make  changes.  This  could 
occur  in several  ways.  As I’ve already  suggested,  the 
reduced  predictability  of  the  relationship  between 
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especially  troublesome.  The  decline  in the  predicta- 
bility  of relationships  between  the  broader  M2  and 
M3  aggregates  and  the  economy  has  been  less 
dramatic,  presumably  because  some  of the  short-run 
shifting  of funds  between  different  classes  of deposits 
and  other  liquid  assets  that  affects  the  behavior  of 
Ml  washes  out  in the  case  of the  broader  measures. 
This  is why  the  Fed  has  continued  to target  M2  and 
M3  this  year,  even  though  we’ve  dropped  the  Ml 
target  for the  time  being.  If this  situation  continues, 
we  could  simply  drop  Ml  permanently  and  focus 
henceforth  on  M2  and  M3,  although  many  of  us 
would  be  disappointed  by  such  a step  since  both  M2 
and  M3  are  rather  amorphous  collections  of  assets 
that  lack the  intuitive  appeal  of the  less-cluttered  M 1 
measure  and  are  likely  more  difficult  to  control. 
If all three  of the  aggregates  on which  we’ve  tradi- 
tionally  focused  continue  to give  us trouble,  we may 
have  to  seek  other  alternatives.  A number  of possi- 
bilities  exist.  One  is  the  monetary  base,  which  is 
loosely  the  sum  of  currency  and  coin  outside 
depository  institutions  and  total  reserves  at  the 
Federal  Reserve.  Another  is  what  is  now  called 
Ml A-non-interest-bearing  demand  deposits  held  by 
the  public  plus  currency  and coin  outside  depository 
institutions.  MlA  corresponds  closely  to  what  we 
used  to call M 1 before  we redefined  M 1 a few years 
ago  to  include  the  interest-bearing  transactions 
deposits  that  have  become  so popular  in the  1980s. 
The  predictability  of the  velocity  of MlA,  like  that 
of the  other  aggregates,  dropped  sharply  in 198 1 and 
1982,  which  was  the  period  in  which  the  initial 
deregulation  of interest  rate  controls  on transactions 
deposits  occurred.  There  is evidence,  however,  that 
the  velocity  of M 1  A, unlike  the  velocities  of M 1, M2 
and M3,  has resumed  a more  normal  and predictable 
pattern.  My  personal  feeling  is  that  this  evidence 
suggests  that  we in the  Fed  should  take  a close  look 
at  the  possibility  of  establishing  a formal  target  for 
MlA. 
The  main  point  I want  to  make  in  this  context, 
however,  is  not  that  one  particular  aggregate  is 
better  than  another.  The  important  point  is that  there 
is no  compelling  reason  to  believe  that  the  deregu- 
lation  of interest  rates  and  the  other  developments 
of recent  years  have  made  it permanently  and  gen- 
erally  impractical  to target  monetary  aggregates.  The 
close  positive  relationship  between  the  growth  of the 
money  supply  and  the  rate  of inflation  over  time  is 
one  of  the  longest-standing  and  most  reliable  rela- 
tionships  in economics.  I see  no  reason  to  believe 
that  this relationship  has  been  destroyed  in any per- 
manent  way  by  events  in  the  1980s.  This  implies 
that  even  if M 1, M2  and  M3,  as they  are  currently 
defined,  have  all  been  rendered  less  useful  as 
monetary  targets,  there  is  still  some  monetary 
aggregate  out  there  somewhere  that  we  a&? be  able 
to  rely  on  once  the  dust  settles.  What  we  have  to 
do is identify  it, and I’m confident  we have  the  means 
to  do  that. 
Th  Dismtihnary  Naturn  of PO&y  Let  me  turn  now 
to  the  third  point  I made  earlier  about  our  present 
monetary  policy  strategy-its  highly  discretionary 
nature.  This  may  surprise  some  of you  mildly,  since 
there  has  been  a  lot  of  loose  talk  in  the  financial 
“My own feehzg,  however-, is that the 
adoption of some fom  of rude, with the 
precofnnzitnzent  a  mZe wOuza  entad,  wouza 
a0  more to imprwe  our strategy, enhance 
our Credibility  as an  infZation  fighter, 
and  maintain our recent progress against 
infZation  than any other singZe  change we 
might make. ” 
press  in recent  years  about  how  the  Fed  has adopted 
a “monetarist”  approach  to  policy,  which  would  in- 
volve,  of  course,  emphasis  on  adhering  to  pre- 
established  rules  in  conducting  monetary  policy. 
Much  of this  comment  has  been  inaccurate  or  at 
least  misleading.  This  is not  the  place  to  go  into  a 
detailed  technical  review  of  the  recent  conduct  of 
monetary  policy,  but  let  me  make  a couple  of quick 
comments  that  I hope  will help  clarify  the  situation 
in  case  any  of  you  have  been  misled.  All  the  talk 
about  the  Fed  “going  monetarist”  started  in October 
of  1979,  when,  in  the  face  of  rapidly  accelerating 
inflation,  rising  inflation  expectations,  and 
deteriorating  conditions  in both  domestic  and  inter- 
national  financial  markets,  the  Federal  Open  Market 
Committee  decided  to  change  its  operating  pro- 
cedures  in order  to improve  its performance  in con- 
trolling  M 1 and  the  other  monetary  aggregates.  The 
basic  change  was  to  drop  the  Federal  funds  rate  as 
the  principal  operating  instrument  for controlling  the 
monetary  aggregates  and replace  it with nonborrowed 
reserves.  There’s  no doubt  in my mind  that  the Com- 
mittee  made  a more  determined  effort  to control  the 
growth  of the  aggregates  in late  1979  and  in certain 
periods  during  the  early  1980s  than  it  had  earlier. 
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rowed  reserves  had  some  features  that  at times  per- 
mitted  money  market  conditions  to  tighten  in  a 
semiautomatic  way in reaction  to above-target  growth 
in the  aggregates.  But  these  changes  did not  by  any 
means  amount  to the  adoption  of a monetary  policy 
rule  in  the  sense  in  which  monetarists,  or  other 
economists  for  that  matter,  use  the  term.  Further, 
the  semiautomatic  features  of  the  nonborrowed 
reserve  operating  procedures  used  between  1979 and 
1982 are not  present  in the  current  operating  regime, 
which,  as  I  pointed  out  earlier,  uses  the  level  of 
seasonal  and  adjustment  borrowing  as the  operating 
instrument. 
Conclusion 
Now  let  me  say  as  clearly  as  I  can  that  this 
question  of  whether  the  longer-run  strategy  of 
monetary  policy  should  be discretionary,  in the  sense 
in  which  I  defined  the  term  earlier,  or  based  on  a 
rule  of  some  kind  is  without  any  doubt  t/re most 
important  standing  issue  in  the  field  of  monetary 
policy  today.  Fed  monetary  policy  has  been  essen- 
tially  discretionary  ever  since  the  famous  Accord 
between  the  Fed  and  the  Treasury  in  195 1.  This 
revealed  preference  for a discretionary  strategy  is easy 
to understand.  In reality  the  Fed  is under  continuous 
pressure  from  the  political  establishment  and  other 
quarters  to take  or not  take  particular  actions,  despite 
the  institutional  safeguards  designed  to shield the  Fed 
from  such  pressures.  In this  kind  of environment  the 
leadership  of the  Fed  understandably  finds  useful  the 
flexibility  afforded  by  a  discretionary  strategy. 
The  case  for  the  adoption  of  a rule,  however,  is 
growing  stronger.  A great  deal  of  new  research  has 
been  done  on  this  rather  old  topic  in recent  years, 
and  the  results  of  a majority  of  these  studies  favor 
a  rule.  In  particular,  important  theoretical  papers 
published  by  Robert  Barro  and  David  Gordon  in 
1983,  which  built on earlier  research  by Finn  Kydland 
and  Edward  Prescott,  concluded  that  discretionary 
strategies  are  inherently  inferior  to  those  based  on 
rules  since they  inevitably  produce  more  inflation  over 
time  with  no  compensating  reduction  in unemploy- 
ment.  The  general  ideas  underlying  this  result  are, 
first,  that  discretionary  policies  affect  the  real 
economy  only  to  the  extent  that  policymakers  are 
able  to surprise  the  public-that  is, take  actions  that 
the  public  doesn’t  anticipate-and,  second,  that  the 
ability  to  surprise  the  public  dissipates  over  time. 
Against  this  background,  many  economists  believe 
that  the  contribution  the  Fed  can  make  to  the 
nation’s  economic  stability  would  be enhanced  by the 
adoption  of a rule,  and I’m inclined  to agree  with this 
conclusion.  Exactly  what form  such  a rule should  take 
and  how  it should  be institutionalized,  of course,  are 
major  practical  issues  that  would  have  to  be  re:- 
solved  before  any  rule  could  be  adopted,  and  I have 
no quick  and easy answers  to these  questions.  I would 
point  out,  however,  that  the  best  rule  might  not 
necessarily  be  a constant  money  growth  rule,  which 
is  what  discussions  of  a  rule  often  bring  to  mind. 
There  are  other  kinds  of  rules,  many  of  which 
permit  more  activist  responses  to  deviations  of im- 
portant  economic  variables  from  their  desired  paths. 
For  example,  the  rule  might  tell  the  Fed  to  adjust 
the  target  ranges  for  the  aggregates  if the  inflation 
rate or some  other  important  economic  variable  began 
to  go  off  track.  Whatever  the  form  of  the  rule,  it 
would  be  essential,  of course,  that  it be  built  around 
and  derived  from  our  overriding  objective  of  con- 
trolling  inflation. 
Let  me just say that  I’ve been  intrigued  by the  issue 
of discretion  versus  rules  in the  conduct  of monetary 
policy  for  many  years.  My  instinct  has  always  been 
that  some  kind  of a rule  would  give  us better  results, 
no  matter  how  noble  our  intentions  might  be  in 
pursuing  a  discretionary  approach,  because  of  the 
precommitment  a  rule  would  involve  and  the 
beneficial  impact  this  precommitment  would  have 
on  the  credibility  of  our  anti-inflationary  strategy.  I 
don’t  pretend  to  comprehend  all  of  the  technical 
aspects  of  the  recent  research  in  this  area,  but  I 
understand  enough  of  it to  be  impressed  by  it,  and 
what  I do  understand  has  reinforced  my  conviction 
that  the  adoption  of  a  rule  would  be  beneficial.  I 
suspect  the  main  problems  in  adopting  and  imple- 
menting  a rule  would  not  be  technical  but  political. 
A procedural  change  of this magnitude  would  require 
at least  the  tacit  support  of a majority  of the  members 
of Congress  as well as the  key people  in the  Executive 
Branch.  Getting  this  support  would  undoubtedly  be 
difficult  because  the  adoption  of  a rule  by  the  Fed 
would  almost  certainly  be seen  as presenting  political 
risks.  In  this  bicentennial  year  of  the  Constitution, 
however,  it is perhaps  not  yet  unrealistic  to believe, 
as  I  do,  that  our  nation  is  still  capable  of  putting 
institutional  constraints  on itself when  they  are clearly 
in  the  public  interest.  And,  as  I’ve  indicated,  the 
evidence  is building  that  a monetary  rule  is in  the 
public  interest.  I can  think  of  no  other  reform  that 
would  do more  to help  us maintain  the progress  we’ve 
made  in  reducing  inflation  over  the  last  five  years. 
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That’s  all I wanted  to  say,  so  let  me  just  briefly 
review  the  main  points  I’ve  tried  to  make.  First,  I 
noted  that  the  possibility  of  a revival  of  inflation  is 
still  a major  risk  in  the  economy.  I concluded  that 
this risk justifies  a careful  reevaluation  of the  strategy 
of  Fed  monetary  policy  to  determine  how  it  might 
be  changed,  if  necessary,  to  ensure  that  it  is  an 
effective  anti-inflationary  weapon.  Against  this 
background,  I then  went  on  to describe  the  present 
strategy,  and  I  discussed  several  of  its  important 
aspects.  First,  I pointed  out  that  the  present  strategy 
is an intermediate  targeting  approach,  and I expressed 
support  for this  general  set  of procedures  despite  its 
criticism  by  some  economists.  Second,  I described 
some  of the  technical  problems  we are currently  ex- 
periencing  with  the  monetary  aggregates  we  have 
been  using  as  intermediate  target  variables,  and  I 
discussed  some  alternative  variables  we  might  con- 
sider  substituting  for these  aggregates  if this becomes 
necessary.  Finally,  and  perhaps  most  importantly, 
I pointed  out  that  the  current  strategy  is  a  discre- 
tionary  one,  as  opposed  to  one  based  on  a  rule.  I 
then  concluded  that  recent  research  has  strengthen- 
ed the  case for a rule,  but  I cautioned  that  any serious 
effort  to  institute  a monetary  policy  strategy  based 
on a rule would  confront  some  thorny  practical  issues. 
My  own  feeling,  however,  is  that  the  adoption  of 
some  form  of rule,  with  the  precommitment  a rule 
would  entail,  would  do more  to improve  our strategy, 
enhance  our  credibility  as  an  inflation  fighter,  and 
maintain  our  recent  progress  against  inflation  than 
any  other  single  change  we might  make.  I personal- 
ly hope  that  we  shall begin  to move  in this  direction 
soon.  The  time  to confront  the  risk of another  round 
of high inflation  is now,  when  the  rate is still relatively 
low.  Once  the  rate  begins  to  accelerate,  it  will  be 
too  late. 
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